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Correlates of International Alignment*
RICHARD A. SKINNER

Old Dominion Unioersity
and
CHARLES W. KEGLEY,

JR.

Uni.versify of South Carolina
The configurations formed from the interactions of political units have been traditional subjects of research. In recent years the tools of empirical analysis have dealt
with political association at the individual level (e.g., party membership , legislative
roll-call analysis), the group level (e.g., electoral coalitions of political parties ), and the
national-international level (e.g. , regional communities, alliances). Little, however ,
has been done to assess the applicability of the numerous concepts , models , and
theories of one area of research for designs in other fields , despite some apparent
parallels. 1 Moreover, studies of cooperative associations at the international level have
focused uponformal'arrangements such as alliances and regional integrative groupings
almost to the exclusion of informal alignments of nation-states, although the latter
appear to be equally important entities in interstate relations.
This study seeks to address one such aspect of association formation at the international level, namely , the factors which account for the creation of informal alignments
whose members are nation-states. The objective is to identify those characteristics
shared by partners to a cooperative dyad which are associated with , and presumably
are promotive of, the formation of informal, voluntary associations . In the absence of an
existing general theory of the dyadic determinants of international alignments , we
have elected to address this topic in an indu ctive, exploratory fashion by examining
empirical data in order to generate some suggestive propositions about the sources of
alignment behavior. Thus , while the analysis is guided by the insights of several
pre-theoretical inquiries into political association , it is based on no single theoretical
perspective . 2
The most generic concept of interstate associative formation , under which other
variants may be subsumed , is "alignment. " As Teune and Synnestvedt suggest,
alignment " . . denotes some aggregative stance of a country with respect to at least
one other country" 3 and refers to all types of cooperation on the international level,
including "diverse but often related phenomena such as military commitments (alliances), common United Nations (or other international organization) voting patterns ,
patterns of diplomatic recognition and visits, and joint diplomatic efforts. "4

* An earlier version of this study was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society , New
Haven, Connecti cut , March 21, 1974.
1
William H . Riker , The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press , 1962); Dina A.
Zinnes , ··coalition Theories and the Balance of Power ," in Sven Groennings , et. al. (eds. ) The Study of Coalition
Behauior (New York: Holt : Rinehart & Winston , 1970), pp. 351-68 ; and Brian Healy and Arthur Stein , ""The
Balance of Power in International History : Theory and Reality ," journal of Conflict Resolut-ion, XVll (March ,
1973), 33-61.
2
This posture is based on the conviction that there currently exists no one theory of political association of
sufficient breadth or cogency to inform us of the major characteristics of international alignment fonnation or to
pe nnit assertions of the relative potencies of particular factors influencing that behavior .
3
Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt , " Measuring International Alignment ," Orbis, IX (Spring , 1965), 175.
4
Robert M. Rood. '"Nations in Combination: A Probability Analysis of Balance-of-Power Alliances ," paper
delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association , New York, 1973, p. 12.
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Following from this general conceptualization, an int erstate alignment is defined as
the configuration formed from the predominantly cooperative political actions of states
toward one another, spanning a wide range of issues and extending across time. 5
Hence , we propos e to study the determinants of alignment formation by identifying an
international alignment as the product of mutually cooperative behavior between two
nations.
Several elements of this definition require elaboration. First , the degree of cooperation obtaining between two states is regarded to be reflective of, and a consequence
ol: their official foreign policy behavior toward one another: cooperation is inferred
from the type of acts initiated by states. To measure conflict and cooperation in foreign
policy behavior , international events data are employed because the event is a unit of
analysis serving as an indicator of the acts initiated by national governments on behalf
of their societies, and pursued beyond national boundaries , to affect changes in the
behavior of other nation-states and international actors in the international system. 6
Conceptually, by virtue of the coding procedures and nature of the data sources from
which they are derived, events data repor t the efforts of national actors to exert control
over others; they are essentially political actions, goal-directed in the Weberian sense
of that term, for the purpose of exerting influence. 7 Accordingly , international events
are useful indicators of alignment behavior because they tap the strategic calculations
of national decision-makers in their search for security. An alignment defined in these
terms is thus a product of deliberate cooperative efforts to achieve a fiiendly relationship with another state.
A second element of the definition of international alignment concerns measurement of the extent to which the interactions betw ee n two states manifest a pr edominant mode of cooperative behavior. How one measures the degree of cooperation
between dyadic partners is, to a large extent, conditioned by the dimensionality of
cooperation and conflict. In general, most researchers accept the assertion that "a ny
social manifestation , . , invariably turns out to be multidimensional and complex
rather than unidimensional and simple. " 8 Still unresolved are the questions of the
number of dimensions accounting for a significant percentage of the variation and the
conceptual labels applied to those dimensions. A recent review of some of the major
taxonomic works dealing with interstate behavior does report evidence indicating that
the behavior is highly structured and relatively invariant over time. Moreover, factor
analytic solutions support the conclusion that conflictual and cooperative foreign policy
behavior appear to be mutually independent and distinct forms of behavior. 9 This
should not be taken to mean that nations manifest a singular mode ofbehavior-either
conflictual or cooperative - across targets or time or even within a particular dyad ;
except in extreme cases, we find nation-pairs demonstrating a behavioral mix of conflict
and cooperation.

• Further distinctions between types of cooperative behavior among nations are suggested by Sullivan and
include "formal alliances,""Coalitions," "informal alignments," and "behavioral alignments" ;John D , Sullivan,
"International Alliances," in Michael Haas (ed .), International Systems ( ew York: Chandler Publishing Co.,
1974), pp. 99-122,
8 Charles W, Kegley, Jr ., et al, (eds .) fotemational Events and tlie Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy
{Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1975).
7
Ibid .
8
Charles A. McClelland , "Some Effects on Theory from the International Event Analysis Movement ," in
Edward E, Azar, Charles A. McClelland , and Richard A, Brody, International Events Interaction Analysis
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications , 1972), p. 32.
9
Charles W. Kegley, Stephen A, Salmore, and David Rosen, "Convergences in the Measurement of
Interstate Behavior," in Patrick J. McGowan (ed. ), Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vol.
II (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications , 1974), pp, 309-39,
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The operational directives of these findings are clear: interstate behavior requires
examination in a dyadic context 10 in order 1) to ascertain its dimensionality and 2) to
uncover th e predominant mode of behavior within any particular dyad . In this way ,
behavior is classified in an empirical, parsimonious , and manageable set of categories,
and a first step is taken toward identifying the class of nation-pairs typifying alignment
status. \Vith this research and reasoning to guide us, an operational measure of
inte rstate alignment can be unequivocally defined , so as to empirically derive a class of
such alignment configurations operative in the international system.
To this end, th e international events data of the World Event/Interaction Survey
(WEIS ) are employ ed. The WEIS data wer e collected 01~ _the basis of sixty-three
mutually exclusiv e categories, which segregate the kinds of foreign policy acts states
initiate. Th e sixty-three categories wer e then collapsed under major categories representing the basic typ es of foreign policy acts. 11 To ensure a meaningful volume of
interaction bet\vee n nations , th e decision was made to includ e only thos e dyads in
which a national actor was observed to int e ract at least five times with another national
actor in the pe riod January , 1966, to August , 1969 (44 months ). This decision produced
a samp le of 452 dir ec ted dyads , possessing a total of 11,007 acts or 81 percent of all acts
TABLE I. Factor Solution of Dyadic Foreign Policy Behavior

Factor
Variable
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Yield
Comment
Explain
Meet
Visit
Host
Approve
Promise
Grant
Rewa rd
Substantive Agree
Agree to Me et
Req ues t
Offer
Urge
Rejec t
Charge
Prot es t
Deny
Issue Warning
Thr eatening Display
Redu ce Relationship
Expel-Seize
Force

% of Total Variance
o/oof Common Varianc e

°

I
.43
.70

.68
.59
.01

Factor
II

.-11
.45
.41
.65
.76

.06

.68

.29

.80
.65
.17
.55
.62
.59
.48
. 17
.45
.12
.10
.05
.08
.01
.05
.12

.04

.71
.09

.43
.59
.58
.76
.69
.85
.85

.83
.71
.89
.58
.40

.68
.32

.04

.42
.76

.13
.24

.26

'12
.35
.69
.64
.77
.58
.46
.73
.43
.53
.3 1
.57
.70
.57
.61

.68
.74
.74
.68
.5 1
.79
.35
.18
.46
. 18
.55

1
Charles W. Kegley and Richard A. Skinner , ''The Case-for-Analysis Problem in the Comparative Study
oflnt erstate Behavior," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), In Search of Global Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1976),
forthcoming.
11
Charles A. McClelland and Ann Ancoli, "An Int eraction Survey of the Midclle East," mimeographed
(Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1970).
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in the WEIS data set. Further criteria relating to the WEIS typology 12 produced a
revised category system of twenty-four classes (See Table I).
Factor analysis 13 was applied to this data set in order to probe the interactions
occuring between these nations (Table I). Despite some ambiguities in the loadings ,
th e rotated solution identified two dimensions representative of conflict (Factor I) and
cooperation (Factor II). The delineation of these dimensions allows us to identify,
when summed dyads are used as cases-for-analysis, 14 which dyadic relationships
demonstrated an unusually high le el of cooperation. Those nation-pairs which
achieve highly cooperative exchanges are regarded as informal alignments . The class of
alignments in the international system was identified by specifying that each aligned
dyad meet the following criteria for inclusion:
1) Each directed dyad must be "active," initiating at least five acts.
2) Each summed dyad must demonsh·ate reciprocity in the number of acts sent and
received ; that is, each directed dyad must be "ac tive. "
3) Each summed dyad must demonstrate a symmetrical relationship ; that is, both
parties must give evidence of a cooperative disposition toward each other. 15
When these criteria were met between two nations, a mean disposition score was
computed for each summed dyad to reveal the level of political collaboration in the
alignment. The resultant class of alignments and their respective disposition score are
presented in Table II.
As can be observed, this operationa l procedure produced a sample of twenty-one
interstate alignments active in the temporal span under investigation . Several features
of this sample are noteworthy . First , the very small number of nation-pairs derived is
itself surprising, constituting less than five percent of the original data source, and
suggests that the criteria used for operationalizing alignment are sufficiently str;ct to
ensure a selective samp le of cases. Indeed , the sample is intriguing because of the
absence of several nation-pairs that intuitive judgement would include in the class of
alignments, such as the Soviet Union and several of the East European countries,
Great Britain-Canada , and the smaller West European states of Belgium and th e
etherlands with their larger neighbors. While our indicators may not be tapping the
full range of cooperative exchanges among aligning states, 16 the general impression
remains that the samp le is representative of the class of behavior that the concept was
intended to embody. Nor is it particularly disturbing to Bnd that the number of active
political alignments is relatively small; such a flnding is consistent with previous

12 Charles W. Kegley, A General Empirical Typology of Foreign Policy Behavior (Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications , 1973), pp. 28-30.
13 The technique employed was the principle component variatio n of factor analysis, orthogonal rotation
with unity values in the diagonal , and two dimensions specified.
14 Kegley and Skinner, 'Th e Case-for-Analysis Problem in the Comparative Study oflnterstate Behavior."
The two variants of the dyadic "case for analysis" are the directed dyad and the summed dyad. The former details
the non recursiv e flow of behavior between two states (A-->B, 8--->A
), whereas the summed dyad aggregates
dyadic behavior without specifying direction (A<-+B ).
1• The disposition index was calculated for each directed dyad according to the following formula:
DispA-> B = cooperation - conflict

cooperation

where cooperation is the factor score obtained for each direct ed dyad on the cooperation dimension (Factor I) of
the rotated factor score obtained for each directed dyad on the conflict dimension (Factor 11). For a discussion of
the use and interpretation of factor scores, see R. J. Rummel , Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston , Jllinois:
Northwestern University Press , 1970), p . 152.
18 For example, transaction indicators might serve as additional measures of cooperative interaction . See,
Cal Clark, "Foreign Trade as an Indicator of Political Integration in the Soviet Bloc," International Studies
Quarterly . XV (September , 1971), 259-95.
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TABLE II. Sample of International Alignments

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
LO.
11.
12.
13.
1-1.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

United States-Canada (.88)
United States-United Kingdom (.97)
United States-West Germany (.87)
United States-Jordan (.70)
United States-Israel (.90)
United States-South Korea (.77)
United States-Japan (.75)
United States-Thailand (.65)
United States-South Vietnam (.84)
United States-Philippines (.77)
United States-Australia (.72)
Honduras-El Salvador (.91)
United Kingdom-West Germany (.89)
Netherlands-Peoples' Republic of China (.96)
Franc e-West Germany (.90)
France-Soviet Union (.76)
Czechoslovakia-Soviet Union (.79)
Soviet Union-United Arab Republic (.65)
Soviet Union-North Vietnam (.59)
Zambia-Rhodesia (.94)
Lebanon-Israel (.89)

evidence that nations are highly selective in the attention they direct to other states in
the international system, 1 7
A second characteristic of the sample is the extent to which it is dominated by dyads
comprised of the more powerful, industrialized states of the international system, most
conspicuously the United States. This finding conforms to theoretical images of the
system as a hierarchical , highly sh·atified political system, 18 in which a few great
powers are responsible for initiating much of the behavior crossing national boundaries. It "fits" as well with previous evidence that activity in the international system is
highly concentrated, such that 22 percent of the 153 countries examined produced
over 80 percent of international events. 19 Hence, it stands to reason that international
alignments would be composed primarily of these active types of national actors.
More specifically, the dominant presence of the United States in the sample attests
to the pervasive American involvement in international affairs, as well as the behavioral res iduals of U. S. "pactomania" in the 1950's. American preoccupation with
Vietnam in the 1966-1969 period is also clearly demonstrated by the sample, with six of
the twelve alignments the United States was a party to involving East or Southeast
Asian states. 20 Similarly , the period for which data were analyzed indicates the early
signs of deterioration of American-West European cooperation by the absence of a
U. S.-France alignment.
17

Kegley, A Generlll Empirical Typology of Foreign Policy Behavior , p, 28,
Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression ," ]ournal of Peace Research , II {1964), 95-119 and
Gustav Lagos. lnt eniational Stratifict1tion and Underdeveloped Countries (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, l964).
19
Charles A. McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard , "Co nflict Patterns in the Interactions Among Nations," in
James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev . ed. (New York: Free Press , 1969). p.
716.
20
It should be noted that the skewedness of the sample toward the developed nations , and especially the
United States, may be an artifact of the WEIS date source, The New York Times . Azar et al. have documented
the exten t to which the Times reports a greater volume of news about orth American and European nations .
See, Edward E. Azar et al.. "'The Problem of Source Coverage in the Use International Events Data ,"
International Studies Quarterly, XVI (September , 1972), 373-88.
18
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Third, the geographical range of the sample includes each of the major regional
subsystems of international politics. The presence of Middle Eastern and Southeast
Asian nations suggests that a sense of threat from a third party may be a key factor in
states' cooperative orientations toward one another. However , the inclusion of the
Zambia-Rhodesia and Honduras-El Salvador alignments in the sample partially vitiates the apparent salience of external threat as a general correlate of alignment
behavior.
A fourth feature of the sample is signified by the two cases mentioned above and the
Netherlands-China coalition: namely, that a potentially wide breadth of issue areas is
encompassed by the sample. Questions of trade and commerce , ideology, and,
perhaps, race are possible correlates of the cooperative interactions between these
states.
Fifth, special mention should be made of several nation-pairs which appear in the
sample. The Czechoslovakia-Soviet Union and U.S.S.R.-U.A.R. alignments are products of the time period for which data were analyzed. The high level of collaboration
between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union , for example, is a partial artifact of the
kind of behavior h·anspiring between the two states in the aftermath of the 1968
intervention. In both instances, an extension of the data or the inte1volation of breaks
in the serial aggregation would provide some additional descriptive precision. For
purposes of this ana.lysis, however , these alignments were retained.
Finally , our original argument that alignment behavior is a mix of cooperative and
conflictuaI interactions is substantiated. As the disposition index va.lues reported in
Table I indicate , a nation's behavior is characterized by cooperation in its relations with
an alignment partner, but not to the exclusion of episodic conflict. This interpretation
conforms to the repeated findings that , in general, conflict and cooperation tend to
covary. 21
Although no validation tests were pe1formed, these features of the derived sample
suggest that the intuitive notions expressed in oui·definition of international a.lignment
have a close conceptual-operational congruence and tap a specific class of interstate
behavior distinct for its cooperative intensity.
At the same time , this perusal demonstrates the need for multivariate analysis of
potential correlates of alignment behavior . The sample itself is suggestive of a large
number of factors influencing such behavior. The next step in this direction is to
examine theoretica.l literature on political association , note hypothesized statements
regarding the determinants of alignment formation , and incorporate them into a design
for empirical testing.
IDENTIFYING THE CORRELATES OF ALIGNME TS
re iew of the major theoretical and empirica.l studies of associative behavior
among political units suggests the absence of reliable generalizations relating preconclitional and precipient factors to that behavior. Thus , there is a large body of research
dealing with international alliances 22 and regional communities , 23 emphasizing variA

21 Kegley . Salmore , and Rosen , "Convergences in the Measurement of Interstate Behavior ," and Richard
A. Brody , "Problems in the Measurement and Analysis of International Events ," in Kegley , et al. (eds. ),
International £vents and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy, pp . 120-31.
22 Julian R. Friedman , Christopher Bladen , and Steven Rosen (eds. ), Alliance in International Politics
(Boston : Allyn & Bacon, 1970); Philip M . Burgess and David W . Moore , "Inter-nation Alliances: An Inventory
and Appraisal of Propositions," in James A. Robinson (ed. ). Political Science Annual , Ill (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co ., 1972); and Ole R. Holsti , P. Terrence Hopmann , and John D . Sullivan , Unity and
Disintegration in International Alliances ( ew York: Wiley-lnterscience , 1973).
23 Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, International Community (New York: Rinehart & Winston , 1970);
James A. Caporaso , Functionalism and Regional Integration (Beverly Hills : Sage Publications , 1972); and
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ous stages of their formation, maintenance , and disintegration. Holsti et. al. concluded
their review of existing theories of alliances with the comment that "general theories of
alliance may actually have only limited validity," noting that "the most striking result is
the consistency of low correlations" obtained from an analysis of 130 alliances against
numerous independent variables. 24 Nor have efforts of researchers to identify strong
relations in the integrative process met with success.
Several factors may account for these poor results. In the analysis of international
economic and political integration, scholars lack cases on which investigation can
proceed . The number of integrating communities is small, and only one such community has established a level of integration which might permit assessment of maintenance activities.
Studies of alliances, on the other hand , are hampered by the lack of behavioral data
covering the tenure and intensity of most alliances. As a result, most studies utilize
frequency counts of the number of alliances in force at particular periods and relate
such aggregate systemic characteristics to other systemic conditions. 25 While such a
focus may be revealing , it fails to allow one to investigate the impact which the
attributes of alliance partners may exert on the formation and/or dissolution of their
relationships.
A second source of hypotheses are the deductive theories of political coalitions.
Kelley has outlined some communalities of research on coalitions:

All are concerned with decision-making in situations in which no single actor can
specify an outcome and bind all other actors to it. In most of the studies the actors
clearly benefit by successfully trying to induce others to form coalitions with
them. In most of the studies the actors accept rules exogenously provided. These
rules specify relevant resources , the extent of resources necessary to win , and
what can be won (or lost). Yet actors in the same and different studies are
differently motivated and the rules are recognized with varying degrees of
specificity. The coalitions formed may be continuous (that is, governing coalitions), episodic (most legislative and electoral coalitions), or terminal (one-shot
specification of benefits to involved actors ). 26
Riker and Gamson have developed two models of coalitions based upon the "size
principle . "27 Both models are attractive for research on the international level espec ially in analyzing balance-of-power theories 28 - although there is reason to
believe that the "situational conditions" required by the models limit their applicability. 29
The more general problems associated with transferring models and theories of
coalition studies and alliance research to the specific design formulated here include-

William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and Propositional Inventory ,"
l11temlLtional St11dies Quarterly, XVII (March , 1973), 89-117.
24 Holsti , Hopmann , and Sullivan , Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, p. 219.
25 See, for example, J,.David Singer and Melvin Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War ,
1815-1945," in J. David Singer (ed.), Quantitativ e International Politics (New York: Free Press , 1968), pp .

247-86.
26 E. \V . Kelley , "Theory and the Study of Coalitions," in Sven Groennings et al. (eds.), The Study of
Coalition Behavior ( ew York: Holt , Rinehart & Winston, 1970), p. 482 .
27
Riker , The Theory of Political Coalitions and William A. Gamson, "An Experimental Test of a Theory of
Coalition Formation," American Sociological Review, XXVI (August, 1961), 565-73 ; "A Theory of Coalition
Formation," American Sociological Review , XXVI Oune , 1961), 373-82.
26 Zinnes, "Coa lition Theories and the Balance of Power. "
29
Burgess and Moore, "Inter-nation Alliances," pp . 346-48.
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1) the general absence of international situations in which a winning position is
readily apparent;
2) the difficulties in determining on a comparative basis decision-makers ' motivations and objectives in entering an international alignment ;
3) consequently, the inability to identify unequivocally the benefits accruing from
alignment participation; and
4) since this study is removed from the institutionalized foci of alliances , legislatures, or elections in which th e re are codified procedures, the problems of
ascertaining in a rigorous manner the extent to which rules or norms are
important parameters of alignment participants ' actions.

Rather than attempt any wholesale adoptions of models or theori es from coalition or
alliance res earc h and th ereby incur th e risk of making unwarranted distortions of the
assumptions of these constructs , we have elected to identify some general propositions
common to both fields of study and incorporate them into a framework for analysis. The
framework is a simplified variation of Vincent's "distance theory " of international
relations .
Distance theory ... works with the basic concepts of attributes, ath·ibute distances and behavior ... Attribute distanc es are determined by computing the
difference (i-j) from the factor scores of nations (i and j ) generated from a factor
analysis of the ath·ibutes. 30
For each nation-pair an absolute - as opposed to a signed - value is computed.
The principle modifications of this theory are 1) the dependent variable - alignment behavior - is a subclass of the universe offoreign policy employed by Vincent; 2)
the distance values computed from the dimensions of attribute indicators are not
summed but retained as independent measures; and 3) a measur e of third-party threat
to an alignment is incorporat ed as an ind epe ndent variable.
The central contention e mbodied by this framework is that the behavior of nationpairs forming alignments is a function of their distanc es on dim ensions of national
attributes and their distances on an index of third-party thr ea t. 31 In the first instance, it
is hypothesized that as the asymmetry of national attributes increases , alignment
formation will result. This hypothesis contrasts with the "compa tibility theo 1y" of
alliances, which predicts that nations align with those nations with which they share
common or similar attributes. 32 Although coalition studies vary in specifying the
dir ectio n of actor resourc es and behavior , this hypoth esis is similar to th e general issue
of uncovering what, if any regularities in the bargaining proc ess are attendant to
alignment formation. 33
In order to deriv e attribute-distance measures for the twenty alignments , 34 nineteen variables were selected from the World Handbook of Social and Political lndicators35 and the entir e sample of 136 countries was factor analyzed by the principal

30
Jack E . Vincent , "New Model s of Conflict and Cooperation for Int ernationa l Re lations Scholars ," paper
delive red at the Annual Meeting of the Int ernati onal Studies Association, New York, 1973, p. 33.
31
The thr ea t index was computed with the formula described earlier (footnot e 15) for all of the 452
nation-pairs of the original factor solution. The value of the thr eat index for each of the twenty-one alignments
was derived by identifying the third-party nation with which both members of an alignment shared the highesl
level of conflict respectively.
32
Brue<' M. Russe tt , "Components of an Operatioool Theory of Int ernational Alliance Formation ,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, XII (September , 1968), 285-301; Burges s and Moore , "I nter-nation Alliances,·•
p . 346 .
33
Kelley, 'Theory and the Study of Coalitions." p. 483.
34
Attrihute indicators for th e Zambia-Rhodesia dyad were not available.
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component technique. Six significant dimensions of national attributes were discerned
from the rotated solution accounting for 75.3 percent of total variance, and these were
labeled in the following manner (presented in descending order of percent of vruiance
accounted for):

I - Development - energy consumption , GNP per capita
II-Militarization - total military manpower, total defense expenditure
III-Political Pe,formance - party fractionalization, electoral regularity
N - Cosmopolitanism - urbanization, b·ade
V - Culture - percent Christian population, percent Moslem population
Factor VI - Dependence - concentration of exports , U. S. economic aid
Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor
Factor

External threat was included as a possible correlate of alignment behavior. 35 The
hypothesis that threat precipitates entry into cooperative associations is replete
throughout the literature on alliances. Liska has argued this position forcefully, claiming that , "Alliances are against , only derivatively for, someone or something. The sense
of community may consolidate alliances; it rarely brings them about." 36
As this position indicates, the inclusion of threat represents a contending
hypothesis to that presented by the measures of national attributes.
A ALYSIS
The six measll!·es of attribute distances and the threat index were regressed against
the disposition scores of the twenty alignments using the maximum R-square improvement variant of stepwise multiple regression. 37 Analysis results are reported in
Table III.
The model producing the highest R2 was a three-vruiable model composed of
Development, Militarization, and Dependence. Before turning to the interpretation
of this model , some mention needs to be made of the alternative models calculated by
the regression technique . In light of the model ultimately derived , the best onevariable model was especially interesting. The index of threat was calculated to be the
best one-variable model, although the R2 produced was only .05. The calculation of
more complex models showed that threat did not contribute significantly to the
accounting of variation until a five-variable model was generated, and, even here,
produced an increase in R2 of only one percent. Similarly , the decision to employ the
TABLE III. "Best Model" of Correlates of Alignments
1

Development

b = 0.79
t = 5.29

2
Militarization

Dependence

R2

F

b = - 0.80
t = - 5.28

b = - 1.11
t = - 2.10

.66

9.91

3

35 Michael C. Hudson and Charles L. Taylor , World Handbook of Social andPoliticallndicators , II (New
Haven : Yale University Press , 1972).
36
George Liska. Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press , 1962), p. 12.
37
This technique defines the "best model" for producing the highest R2 by analyzing every one•, two- ...
k-variable t'Ombination. Once a model is obtained , each of the variables in the model is subsequently compared
to each variable not in the model. "For each comparison, the procedure determines if removing the variable in
the model and replacing it wit!, the presently ex.eluded variable would increase R2 . After all the possible
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three-variable model was predicated on the finding that a four-variable model which
included a distance measure of Political Performance accounted for 68 percent of
variation - an increase of only two percent in R2 . Ind eed, the entire set of seven
corre lates produced an improvement of only three percent over the three-variable
model. The three-variable model represents a parsimonious solution , and, at the same
time, reaffirms our intuitive position that bivariate analyses of interstate behavior are
generally insufficient for dealing with the complexity of that behavior.
INTERPRETATIO
The three-variable model relating distance scores on the Development , Militarization , and Dependence attribute dimensions provides , at once, partial support for both
the compatibility and distance theories and a challenge to the assertion that external
threat is a key correlate of international alignment. As noted above, the index of threat
failed to demonstrate any degree of potency in accounting for alignment behavior. This
may reflect the overall patterns of international interaction outlined by McClelland
and Hoggard. Their analysis of the WEIS data indicated that interstate relations "are
not quite as conflict-ridden as some have supposed. "38 Hence , the formation of
cooperative associat ions among nations seems to be motivated less by decision-makers'
perceptions of clear-and-present threats , than by implicit recognitions of the hierarchica l configuration of states and the skewed distribution of capabilities within the
international system.
At the same time , it seems probable that alignments are products of proc esses,
requiring longitudinal observations and analysis. This conceptualization suggests that
threat may indeed serve as a precipitant factor for states' initial associative actions.
Subsequent developments in the alignment process resemble learning models in
which member behavior is conditioned by learned expectations of the actions/reactions of other alignment members. 39 A cross-sectional design such as ours cannot test
for these dynamic processes , and we heartily endorse further research embodying
longitudina l analyses of cooperative interactions.
Turning to the confirmatory aspects of this analysis , we find an intennix of results
regarding the compatibility and distance theories of international political association.
Recalling that our independent variables are measured in terms of attribute distances
between alignment partners , the sign of the respective regression coefficients 0J) is
readily interpretable . A negative sign for b, as in the case of the Militarization and
Dependence corre lates, signifies that the greater the distance between two aligning
states, the less the intensity of cooperative behavior. Conversely, a positive value for b,
as with the Development measure, signifies that the greater the distance between two
nations on this attribute dimension , the higher the intensity of alignment. It is the
patt ern of positive and negative regression coefficients that guides our interpretation of
the regression model.
The distance theory is rendered plausible by the Development variab le's presence
and its positive h-value in the three-variable model. But in light of the negative b-value
associated with the Dependence measure , we are led to conclude that the assymmetry
the distance predicts for alignm ents is large ly one of economic inequality behveen
alignment partners , rather than a client-patron relationship. Further credence is
afforded this interpretation by the negative b-value of the Militarization variab le:
aligning states generally share commensurate (albeit, relative ) levels of military capability. Alignments thus represent a strategy for' smaller states whereby resources are
38
39
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indirectly augmented through cooperative association with larger, more developed
nations.
For more developed countries, alignments offer means for enhancing status or
prestige. Moreover , since national decision-makers contend with an uncertain environment in which a winning margin is usually indeterminate, alignment formation,
even with less-developed partners , provides a strategy for aggrandizement of national
power.
· of th e compa t·b·J·ty
th eory 1s
· th at states w1·11al'1gn wit. h
The primary contention
1 1 1
those nations with which they share common characteristics such as culture , language ,
or political institutions. Although our analysis does not incorporate all of the representative indicators of the theory , the one measure - Culture - which is analyzed does
not constitute a potent correlate in any of our results. Still , the raw data for this
dimension were primarily measures of religious affiliation within nations , and it
therefore remains unclear whether this particular aspect of the compatibility theory is
upheld by our results.
Alternatively and to the extent that the compatibility theory is intended to embody
similarities of national attributes as correlates of international alignments , our findings
offer only partial support for this contention. The negative b-values of the Militarization and Dependence dimensions conform to the notion of states that 1) share relatively
similar levels of military capability and 2) are not dependent upon other nations via aid
or trade acting to form cooperative associations.
In reh·ospect , the partial support afforded both the distance and the compatibility
theories by this analysis is not especially contradictory. A review of the twenty-one
aligning dyads identified earlier reveals that a crude dichotomy may resolve the
apparent conundrum. Many of the alignments to which the United States and the
Soviet Union are partners are representative of the asymmetric relationships described by the distance theory. American alignment with Jordan , Thailand, and South
Vietnam, as well as Soviet cooperation with the U.A.R. and orth Vietnam , typify a
developed / less developed alignment.
The second group of alignments includes the Honduras-El Salvador , United
Kingdom-West Germany, France-West Germany , and Zambia-Rhodesia dyads , and
provides a substantive example of the type of symmetric relationship predicted by the
compatibility theory .
The dichotomization of the original twenty-one alignments also gives rise to a
reconsideration of the role of threat in alignment formation. Although our findings cast
doubt on the importance of threat for dyadic cooperation, other situational variables
such as the war experience of an alignment member may serve to more fully test the
potency of a nation 's conflictual milieu for its cooperative actions.
A final note of interpretation concerns the issue of systemic influences upon
alignment behavior. The large number of alignments involving either the United
States or the Soviet Union suggests that future research in this field might well benefit
from Galtung's theory of rank and social status. His concepts of"top dog" and " underdog" seem well-suited to analyses of dyadic patterns of cooperation. 40
Problems specific to this study (e.g., the small number of alignments, our reliance
upon one type of data for measuring alignment behavior ) as well as the more persistent
dilficulties of empirical research (e.g., random and systematic measurement errors)
place obvious limitations on the scope of our findings. Further refinement of concepts

40
Johan Gal tung , "Rank and Social Integration : A Multidimensional Approach ," in Joseph Berger , Morris
Zelditch, Jr. , and Bo Anderson (eds .), Sociological Theories in Progress (Boston : Houghton Miffijn, 1966), pp .
145-98.
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and methods and a more extensive explication of the "p rethem-y" of international
alignments are in order.
Despite these problems , we are sufficiently encouraged by our findings to urge an
extension and expansion of the model of international alignment formation presented
here . We perceive our results as both a chalJenge and a complement to existing
theories of international political association and the research strategies each entails.
This conclusion suggests that some revision of the conventional wisdom regarding the
relative potencies of particular factors in contributing to the formation of international
alignments should be considered.

